University of Wollongong

Research Online
Faculty of Commerce - Papers (Archive)

Faculty of Business and Law

January 2002

Encouraging Tutorial Attendance at University did not Increase
Performance
Joan R. Rodgers
University of Wollongong, jrrodger@uow.edu.au

Follow this and additional works at: https://ro.uow.edu.au/commpapers
Part of the Business Commons, and the Social and Behavioral Sciences Commons

Recommended Citation
Rodgers, Joan R.: Encouraging Tutorial Attendance at University did not Increase Performance 2002.
https://ro.uow.edu.au/commpapers/172

Research Online is the open access institutional repository for the University of Wollongong. For further information
contact the UOW Library: research-pubs@uow.edu.au

Encouraging Tutorial Attendance at University did not Increase Performance
Abstract
When tertiary education is subsidized the cost of poor student performance in university subjects falls
not only on the individual student but also on society in general. Society therefore has an interest in
promoting student performance. There is evidence in the literature that absenteeism from university
classes is widespread and that absenteeism adversely affects student performance. In this paper I
describe an incentive scheme that increased attendance of business and economics students in an
introductory statistics subject at a typical Australian university. Like other authors I find a strong positive
association between attendance and academic performance, both in the presence and absence of the
scheme. However, there is no evidence that the incentive scheme caused student performance to
improve. Although students attended more classes they did not perform better than students in the
previous year’s class who had the same observable characteristics and attendance levels but who were
not exposed to the scheme.

Disciplines
Business | Social and Behavioral Sciences

Publication Details
This article was originally published as Rodgers, JR, Encouraging Tutorial Attendance at University did not
Increase Performance, Australian Economic Papers, 41(3), 2002, 255-266. Copyright Blackwell 2002.
Original journal available here.

This journal article is available at Research Online: https://ro.uow.edu.au/commpapers/172

Encouraging Tutorial Attendance at University did not Improve Performance

JOAN R. RODGERS
University of Wollongong

Submitted, May 2000.
Revised, February 2001.
Final revision, September 2001.

Abstract
When tertiary education is subsidized the cost of poor student performance
in university subjects falls not only on the individual student but also on society in
general. Society therefore has an interest in promoting student performance.
There is evidence in the literature that absenteeism from university classes is
widespread and that absenteeism adversely affects student performance. In this
paper I describe an incentive scheme that increased attendance of business and
economics students in an introductory statistics subject at a typical Australian
university. Like other authors I find a strong positive association between
attendance and academic performance, both in the presence and absence of the
scheme. However, there is no evidence that the incentive scheme caused student
performance to improve. Although students attended more classes they did not
perform better than students in the previous year’s class who had the same
observable characteristics and attendance levels but who were not exposed to the
scheme.
Key words: class attendance, class absenteeism, academic performance
JEL codes: A22, I21

I.

INTRODUCTION

Both in North America and Australia substantial numbers of university
students regularly skip classes. Romer (1993, p. 167) described absenteeism
in economics subjects at three “relatively elite” U.S. universities as “rampant”,
having found that approximately one third of students were absent from class
on a given day. Absenteeism among Romer’s sample of students was higher
in large classes than in small classes, lower in classes with a substantial
mathematical content than in non-mathematical classes, higher in core
subjects than in noncompulsory electives, and lower in classes taught by
experienced academic staff than in classes taught by casual lecturers.
Devadoss and Foltz (1996) observed students studying agricultural
economics and agribusiness and found that class attendance was positively
related to the ability and motivation of the student. Several other results also
emerged from Devadoss and Foltz’ study. Students financing their own
studies through work or student loans had better attendance records than
students on scholarship or students who were financially supported by their
parents. Classes taught by lecturers who had won teaching awards and
classes taught by lecturers who used an interactive teaching style were better
attended than other classes. Classes scheduled between 10am and 3pm
were better attended than classes scheduled either earlier or later.
Most academics believe intuitively that students benefit from attending
classes. This is not simply egotism on the part of academics; there is
evidence to suggest that attendance does matter for academic achievement.

1

Devadoss and Foltz (1996) found that students who attended all classes in
agricultural economics and agribusiness achieved (on average) a full letter
grade higher than students who attended no more than 50 percent of the
same classes. Durden and Ellis (1995) reported a nonlinear relationship
between attendance and performance: missing a few classes seemed not to
matter but students who missed more than four classes in a one-semester
principles of economics subject performed at a significantly lower level than
students who attended all classes. Romer (1993) found that attendance had a
significant, positive impact on students’ performance in a one-semester
intermediate macroeconomics subject. An average-GPA student in Romer’s
sample who attended all classes was predicted to score a B+, compared with
a C+ for a student who attended 25 percent of classes. Park and Kerr (1990)
found that attendance was significant in determining the odds of avoiding a D
grade in a money and banking subject. Schmidt (1983) analyzed performance
of students taking macroeconomic principles and found time spent in lectures
and time spent in discussion groups had a significant, positive effect on
performance. None of these studies proves that a causal relationship exists
between attendance and performance but they document a strong association
and are consistent with the hypothesis that such a causal relationship exists.
Given the evidence that absenteeism is common and that it may
impede performance, it is worthwhile considering ways to encourage class
attendance. Compulsory attendance is difficult to enforce although Romer
(1993, p. 173) reminds us that a generation ago attendance both in principle
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and in practice was mandatory in some U.S. universities. Short of compulsion,
incentives of various types, such as points for class participation or
unannounced quizzes that contribute to the final grade, can be used to
discourage absenteeism. Devadoss and Foltz (1996) found that incentives of
this sort have a significant, positive impact on attendance.
Monitoring attendance poses logistical problems for large classes. In
Australian universities, large lectures are common, particularly for subjects at
the 100 level.1 Small classes tend to be associated with lectures in elective
subjects, many of which are offered at the 200 or 300 level, and with tutorials,
which typically are conducted as small discussion groups. Australian
academic staff and students seem to regard tutorial attendance as at least as
important as lecture attendance, possibly because tutorials offer a greater
opportunity for student participation. This paper examines the effectiveness of
one method used by the author to encourage small-group tutorial attendance
at a typical Australian university. In Section II the incentive scheme is
described along with the circumstances in which it was used. The effect of the
incentive scheme on attendance rates is examined in Section III. In Section IV
the incentive scheme is evaluated as a mechanism for improving
performance. Section V summarizes the conclusions of the study.

II.

DESCRIPTION OF THE INCENTIVE SCHEME

The incentive scheme described in this paper was used in the late 1990s
in a one-semester, introductory statistics subject taught to undergraduates at a
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medium size Australian university. Approximately 85 percent of the several
hundred students in the class each semester are undertaking a Bachelor of
Commerce degree (specializing in business or economics) and for these
students the subject is compulsory. Most of the remaining 15 percent of
students are enrolled in an Arts degree, for some of whom the subject is
compulsory while for others it is not. At the time of this study there were three
50-minute lectures per week for 14 weeks delivered to the class as a whole.
Each student was also required to attend one 50-minute tutorial in each of
Weeks 2 through 14. Tutorial groups consisted of 20 or fewer students.
Students were instructed to attempt a problem set prior to each tutorial. The
problems involved the application of material covered in lectures in the
preceding week. Nine of the 13 tutorial meetings were held in a regular
classroom where a tutor presented the answers to as many of the problems as
time permitted and responded to students’ questions. Students were not
required to submit their answers for marking but they could mark their own work
using an answer key, which was made available at the beginning of the week
following the tutorial in which the problem set was discussed. The remaining
four tutorial meetings were held in a computer laboratory where students, with
the help of their tutor, learned how to use a statistical package to generate
output with which to solve statistical problems.
Under the incentive scheme each student’s mark for the subject as a
whole was reduced by one percentage point for every tutorial missed in
excess of two. (No penalty was applied for an absence if the student
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submitted written documentation, such as a medical certificate, in evidence of
a legitimate reason for non-attendance.) An effort was made to ensure that
students understood the incentive scheme: it was explained in the subject
outline, copies of which were distributed in lectures and made available on the
Web at the beginning of the semester. The scheme was explained to students
during the first lecture and students were reminded of its existence on several
occasions during the semester.
The efficacy of the incentive scheme is evaluated in Section III by
comparing tutorial attendance rates in the semester when the scheme was
used, with those of the same semester in the previous year when the scheme
was not used. The two years are referred to below as the “trial year” and the
“control year”, respectively. This methodology is valid only if the teaching
environment is the same in both years. Before presenting the analysis,
therefore, it is appropriate to compare the subject and its organization in the
two years.
(a)

The lecturer was the same in both years.

(b)

The content and presentation of lectures was fundamentally the same

in both years. The same topics were presented using PowerPoint slides. The
only change made to lecture content was to update some of the examples.
(c)

The method of assessment was the same in both years except for the

incentive scheme. There were three tests during the semester, worth 15
percent, 10 percent and 15 percent respectively, and a comprehensive final
examination, worth 60 percent. Tests had the same coverage of material,
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were of the same duration and were conducted at the same time during the
semester in both years. Test 1 was multiple-choice, Test 2 consisted of
problems similar to those assigned as tutorial preparation and Test 3
assessed knowledge of the output generated by the statistical package used
in the subject. The questions asked on the tests and the final examination
were different in the two years but were intended to be of the same level of
difficulty.
(d)

The same head tutor was employed in both years. In the trial year the

head tutor conducted seven of the eleven tutorial groups; in the control year
the head tutor taught six of the eleven tutorial groups.2 Accurate records of
tutorial attendance were kept in both years. In the trial year students signed
an attendance sheet; in the control year a roll call was taken in each tutorial.
(e)

The problems assigned as tutorial preparation were taken from the

textbook, which was the same in both years. All problems assigned in the trial
year were also assigned in the control year but five of the 175 problems
assigned in the control year were omitted in the trial year.
(f)

Two weeks into the semester in the trial year there were 226 students

in the class, 12.4 percent of whom later withdrew. At the same point in time in
the control year there were 189 students enrolled in the subject, 12.1 percent
of whom later withdrew.3
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III.

THE EFFECT OF THE INCENTIVE SCHEME ON ATTENDANCE
Data sets for the two years were constructed using official class lists

and records of attendance kept by the tutors. Students who had withdrawn
from the subject by the end of the second week were excluded from the
analysis because these students did not seriously attempt the subject.4 The
analysis reported in the first part of this section was performed on the
remaining students, including those who withdrew after the end of the second
week. It was recognized that the incentive scheme might encourage students
with a propensity to miss tutorials to withdraw from the subject altogether. If
so, excluding these students from the analysis would lead to an underrepresentation of low-attendance students in the trial year and an upward bias
in any observed improvement in the attendance rate compared with the
control year. In fact, as already mentioned in Item (f) within Section II, the
withdrawal rate was approximately the same in both years so this theoretical
possibility does not appear to have been the case. The data set is referred to
below as “All Students”.
Some of the students who eventually withdrew (13 in the year when the
incentive scheme was used and 8 in the control year) attended no tutorials.
Whether these students seriously attempted the subject prior to withdrawal is
unknown. On the assumption that they did not, the analysis was repeated with
these students excluded from it. This second data set is called “>0-Tut
Students” below. Finally, for completeness, the analysis was repeated using
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only students who remained enrolled until the end of the semester. This third
data set is called “No-WD Students”.5
Each student’s attendance was determined from the tutor’s records. An
absence that was excused for assessment purposes was not counted as an
attendance for this study because an incentive scheme cannot be judged
successful if it simply encourages students to document their absences rather
than reduce them.
The percentages of students in the three data sets who attended 0, 1,
2, … 13 tutorials in the two years are presented in Table I. The percentage of
students with “good” attendance records was higher in the year when the
incentive scheme was used than in the control year. The percentage of “All
Students” who attended all 13 tutorials in the trial year was 16.8 compared
with 12.7 percent in the control year. Almost 35 percent of “All Students”
missed no more than one tutorial in the trial year compared with 21.7 percent
in the control year. Almost 50 percent of “All Students” missed no more than
two tutorials in the trial year compared with 37 percent in the control year. The
proportion of students with poor attendance records was lower in the year
when the incentive scheme was used than in the control year. The percentage
of “All Students” who attended six or fewer of the 13 tutorials in the trial year
was 23.5 compared with 33.3 percent in the control year. Only among the
chronically absent was attendance worse in the year when the incentive
scheme was used: 7.5 percent of “All Students” missed all 13 tutorials in the
trial year compared with 5.8 percent in the control year. Attendance-rate
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differentials of similar magnitude between the two years apply to the “>0-Tut
Students” and the “No WD Students”. Wilcoxan Rank-Sum tests6 performed
on the three data sets in Table I all indicate that the distribution of attendance
in the control year is located below the distribution of attendance in the year
when the incentive scheme was used. These results are all statistically
significant at the 0.1% level.
{Table I about here.}
The average attendance in the year when the incentive scheme was
used was 10.079 (out of 13) tutorials, compared with 8.899 in the control year.
I now examine whether the increase in attendance can be explained by
differences in the nature of the students in the two years. Descriptive statistics
for students in the two groups are shown in Table II.7 The average mark on
other subjects taken in the same semester as my class is a proxy for the
ability of the student. The number of credit points taken until the end of the
semester and the number of credit points dropped during the semester reflect
the students involvement in university study.8 These variables, as well as fullfee paying status9 and the time at which the tutorial was held, were found to
be important determinants of attendance in the Devadoss and Foltz’ study that
was discussed in the introduction to this paper. First-year status10, gender and
type of degree undertaken are also considered. The only differences between
the two years that are significant at the five percent level are mean tutorial
attendance and mean number of credit points recorded at the end of the
semester.
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{Table II about here.}
By how much did the attendance of a typical student increase as a
result of the incentive scheme? Table III reports the results of an OLS
regression analysis of the effect of the incentive scheme on attendance (see
Columns 1 and 2) and the marginal effects from a Tobit estimation (see
Columns 3 and 4). The OLS and Tobit results are very similar. The effect of
the incentive scheme is to increase attendance by approximately one tutorial,
a result that is highly statistically significant. Only three other coefficients in
the attendance equation are statistically significant: other things equal,
students with high average marks in other subjects taken during the same
semester have higher tutorial attendance rates, first-year students attend
more tutorials than later-year students, and males skip more tutorials than
females. Having a tutorial either early or late in the day had no significant
effect on attendance, probably because students selected their own tutorial
times. Being a full-fee-paying student had no significant effect on attendance.
Students who dropped credit points during the semester had much the same
attendance as students who maintained the same workload throughout the
semester.
{Table III about here.}

IV.

THE EFFECT OF THE INCENTIVE SCHEME ON PERFORMANCE
If attending tutorials increases learning then the reduction in

absenteeism documented in this paper is to be applauded. A causal link
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between attendance and performance is difficult to identify statistically
because students choose whether to attend class. Missing class could be a
rational act by a student who is unable to assimilate information aurally and
substitutes study for class attendance. Alternatively, absenteeism could
constitute self-destructive behaviour resulting from lack of motivation, a high
time preference for leisure or poor time-management skills. These underlying
factors are difficult to incorporate into a formal analysis of the relationship
between attendance and performance because they are difficult to measure. If
each student’s attendance could be set using a random process then a
regression of performance on attendance (and other relevant variables) would
be able to detect a causal relationship, if one exists. In the absence of such
an experiment, I examine (a) the association between the tutorial attendance
and performance in both years and (b) the association between the incentive
scheme and student performance at various levels of attendance.
The incentive scheme can be viewed as a mechanism for increasing
the marginal benefit of attending tutorials but its efficacy depends upon the
nature of the performance-attendance relationship for the two groups of
students.11 The performance-attendance relationship in the control year can
be used to estimate what the performance of students subjected to the
incentive scheme would have been, had the incentive scheme not been used.
An upward shift in the relationship between the two years would indicate that
the scheme was successful. That is, performance would have increased
beyond what could be attributed to increased exposure to the subject matter
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associated with increased attendance. This could occur if students discover
that Statistics is interesting and devote more effort to studying the material. If
the performance-attendance relationship is strictly increasing and the same in
both years then the scheme could also be judged a success in the sense that
it increased performance via the additional exposure to material associated
with attending an additional tutorial. However, a downward shift in the
relationship between the control year and the trial year would indicate that the
incentive scheme was unsuccessful. Under the latter scenario, students
attend more tutorials as a result of the incentive scheme but do not perform
better because of a negatively compensating reduction of effort.
To produce a measure of academic performance for this paper that is
not directly affected by the incentive scheme I added back on to the final
marks of students in the trial year any marks that were deducted for
absenteeism. When this was done, there was no significant difference
between the mean marks of 52.92 in the year when the incentive scheme was
used and 53.59 in the control year.
Table IV reports the results of a regression analysis of the effect of
tutorial attendance on performance. The two years of data were pooled and a
dummy variable was used to indicate the presence or absence of the
incentive scheme. Attendance was represented by 13 dummy variables, the
omitted category being perfect attendance. Interactions between the dummy
variable for the incentive scheme and the dummy variables for attendance
were included, thereby allowing the performance-attendance relationship to
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differ for the two groups of students (see columns 1 through 4 in the top
section of Table IV).12 Columns 5 and 6 list the differences between the
coefficients in the two years and the P-values of the differences.
{Table IV about here.}
Like the studies reported in the introduction to this paper, the results in
Table IV depict a direct relationship between attendance and performance in
both years. This is evident in the negative and statistically significant,
coefficients on the attendance dummies in each year. In the control year,
students with 1, 2 or 3 absences performed approximately the same as
students who attended all 13 tutorials but students who missed 4 or 5 tutorials
scored approximately 12 fewer marks than students with perfect attendance.
An additional 10 to 12 marks were forfeited by students absent from 6 or 7
tutorials. In the trial year, the first three absences “cost” the student
approximately eight marks each. In both years students who attended five or
fewer tutorials scored approximately 30 fewer marks than students with
perfect attendance.
Four of the six independent variables included in the regression are
statistically significant at approximately the five percent level or lower. The first
independent variable, the student’s average mark (out of 100) in other
subjects taken during the same semester as my subject, is a proxy for ability
but it probably also reflects attendance in those other subjects. Assuming
attendance is correlated across subjects, the inclusion of this variable is likely
to result in an under-estimate of the effect of tutorial attendance on
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performance in my class.13 The second independent is a dummy variable for
students in their first year at university. Assuming the transition from high
school to university requires some adjustment it was hypothesized that firstyear students would perform at a lower level than later-year students. This
hypothesis is supported by the data: first-year students, on average, scored
6.3 marks lower than later-year students. The third independent variable is a
dummy variable for students who pay full fees. The assumption is that these
private students are more motivated or perhaps better prepared academically
than students whose tuition is subsidized. The results support this hypothesis;
full-fee paying students scored four marks higher than their subsidized
counterparts. The fourth independent variable is the number of credit points
taken by the student in the current semester. Assuming that more motivated
students take more credit points, this independent variable is expected to be
positively related to performance. This expectation is confirmed by the positive
coefficient on current credit points. No significant differences were found
between the performances of males and females, nor between the
performances of students undertaking a Bachelor of Commerce degree and
those enrolled in other degrees.
An assessment of the efficacy of the incentive scheme in increasing
learning requires a comparison of the performance-attendance relationships
of a typical student in the two years. The relationship is implicit in the
coefficients of the attendance dummies in Table IV. An explicit example is
provided in Table V, which has been constructed using the coefficients in
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Table IV and the assumption that a typical student has an mean mark of 57 on
other subjects taken in the same semester, is not in first-year, is not paying full
fees, is enrolled in 24 credit points at the end of the semester, is female and is
enrolled in a Bachelor of Commerce degree. Profiles of students with other
characteristics that are included as independent variables in Table IV would
differ from the profile in Table V only by the addition, or subtraction, of a
constant to performance at each level of attendance.
{Table V about here.}
Was the incentive scheme successful in increasing performance?
Apparently not! There is certainly no upward shift in the performanceattendance relationship from the control year to the year in which the incentive
scheme was used. The two profiles are statistically indistinguishable at all
attendance levels except ten, where the penalty applied, and eleven, where
the penalty did not apply (see Column 6 of Table IV). At these two attendance
levels performance was significantly lower under the incentive scheme. This
suggests that there were students in the trial year who attended eleven rather
than ten tutorials in an effort to avoid the penalty, but who learned no more
than they would have done if they had attended only ten tutorials. This
behaviour resulted in a decrease in the performances of students with
attendances of ten and eleven, compared with students in the control year.

15

V.

CONCLUSIONS

The evidence presented in this paper is that tutorial attendance in an
introductory statistics class improved by approximately one tutorial under an
incentive scheme that imposed a small penalty for missing more than two out
of 13 tutorials. A priori, it was not known whether students would respond to
the incentive scheme. They may not have believed that the penalty for not
attending tutorials would actually be applied, they may not have cared enough
about their academic grades for the penalty to matter, or the penalty may
have been too small to be effective.
There was a positive association between tutorial attendance and
performance of students both in the year when the incentive scheme was
used and in the previous year when the incentive scheme was not in force.
This is consistent with the evidence from U.S. universities. Nevertheless, the
incentive scheme did not improve students’ performance. Students attended
more classes but did not perform better than students with the same
characteristics and attendance levels in the previous year when the scheme
was not used. At some attendance levels, students performed worse. Clearly,
attendance per se does not ensure that learning takes place. Physical
presence and intellectual involvement are quite different phenomena. My
results suggest that there are no “easy fixes” in dealing with absenteeism but
they do not rule out the possibility that other types of incentives may be
effective in increasing both attendance and performance. More information is
needed on why students skip classes and how they utilize the time so gained.
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Table I
Tutorial Attendance Rates (%)
No. of
Tutorials
Attended

All Students

>0-Tut Students

No-WD Students

Control Yr Trial Yr

Control Yr Trial Yr

Control Yr Trial Yr

0

5.8

7.5

1.7

1.9

1.8

2.0

1

3.2

1.8

3.3

1.9

1.8

1.0

2

5.3

2.2

5.5

2.3

5.4

1.5

3

6.9

3.5

7.2

3.8

4.8

1.5

4

4.2

2.7

4.4

2.8

3.0

1.0

5

5.8

4.0

6.1

4.2

6.0

3.5

6

2.1

1.8

2.2

1.9

2.4

2.0

7

5.8

5.3

6.1

5.6

6.0

6.1

8

6.3

3.5

6.6

3.8

6.6

4.0

9

7.4

8.4

7.7

8.9

8.4

9.6

10

10.1

9.3

10.5

9.9

11.4

10.6

11

15.3

15.0

16.0

16.0

17.5

17.2

12

9.0

18.1

9.4

19.2

10.2

20.7

13

12.7

16.8

13.3

17.8

14.5

19.2

Wilcoxan Rank-Sum Tests
No. of Students
Mean Rank

189

226

181

213

166

198

190.2

222.9

177.1

214.8

162.2

199.5

Approx Z-statistic

-2.7694

-3.2765

-3.3649

P-value

0.0028

0.0005

0.0004
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Table II
Descriptive Statistics
Variable

Control Year

Trial Year

Number of tutorials attended

8.899***
(3.540)

10.079***
(2.947)

Average mark on other subjects in the
same semester (%)

57.061
(15.498)

57.415
(14.538)

Credit points at end of semester

21.522***
(4.770)

23.068***
(3.816)

Credit points dropped during semester

0.591
(2.081)

0.545
(1.857)

In 1st-year

0.403

0.455

Paying full fees

0.321

0.246

Male

0.629

0.618

Not in B.Com degree

0.176

0.131

In a tutorial between 9.30am & 3.30pm

0.566

0.581

In a tutorial at 8.30am

0.063

0.073

In a tutorial at 4.30pm

0.277

0.272

In a tutorial at 5.30pm

0.094

0.073

159

191

Mean
(Standard Deviation)

Proportion

No. of observations

*** Significantly different from each other at the 0.1 percent level of significance.
** Significantly different from each other at the 1 percent level of significance.
* Significantly different from each other at the 5 percent level of significance.
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Table III
Effect of the Incentive Scheme on Attendance+
Variable

Coeff
(OLS)

Pvalue

Pvalue

(2)

Marg
Effect
(Tobit)
(3)

(1)
Intercept

2.168

0.001

1.154

0084

Incentive Scheme = 1, 0 otherwise

1.107

0.000

1.041

0.000

Average mark on other subjects in the
same semester

0.119

0.000

0.115

0.000

1st-year student = 1, 0 otherwise

1.036

0.000

1.113

0.000

Full-fee paying student = 1, 0 otherwise

0.340

0.284

0.277

0.384

Credit points dropped during semester

-0.109

0.132

-0.105

0.141

Male=1, 0 otherwise

-0.710

0.014

-0.615

0.034

In a tutorial at 8.30am = 1, 0 otherwise

-0.622

0.270

-0.443

0.441

In a tutorial at 4.30pm = 1, 0 otherwise

-0.134

0.681

-0.139

0.670

In a tutorial at 5.30pm = 1, 0 otherwise

0.310

0.555

0.270

0.608

+

(4)

The dependent variable is the number of tutorials attended out of 13.

Sample Size = 350 (159 in the control year and 191 in the trial year)
OLS Regression
R2 = 0.387, Adjusted-R2 = 0.370, F-statistic = 23.81 (P-value = 0.000),
Breusch-Pagan’s chi-square statistic (with 9 degrees of freedom) = 13.15
(P-value = 0.156). The null hypothesis (homoscedasticity) is not rejected.
Tobit Estimation
Limits = 0 and 13, sigma = 3.003, (P-value = 0.000).
Marginal effects are calculated at the means of the independent variables.
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Table IV
The Effect of Attendance on Performance+
Control Year
Variables interacting with the
dummy for the incentive scheme

Trial Year

Difference
Trial Yr – Control Yr

Coeff

P-value

Coeff

P-value

Coeff

P-value

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5) = (3) – (1)

(6)

Intercept

16.795

0.026

19.240

0.012

2.446

0.442

12 tutorials = 1, 0 otherwise

-4.694

0.335

-7.701

0.012

-3.007

0.591

11 tutorials = 1, 0 otherwise

0.141

0.964

-14.907

0.000

-15.048

0.002

10 tutorials = 1, 0 otherwise

-3.968

0.276

-23.820

0.000

-19.851

0.001

9 tutorials = 1, 0 otherwise

-12.567

0.011

-19.309

0.000

-6.742

0.301

8 tutorials = 1, 0 otherwise

-12.064

0.106

-28.684

0.000

-16.620

0.094

7 tutorials = 1, 0 otherwise

-22.228

0.027

-33.353

0.000

-11.125

0.324

6 tutorials = 1, 0 otherwise

-24.500

0.023

-21.306

0.049

3.194

0.833

5 tutorials = 1, 0 otherwise

-31.092

0.000

-32.985

0.003

-1.893

0.880

4 tutorials = 1, 0 otherwise

-41.140

0.000

-37.585

0.000

3.556

0.793

3 tutorials = 1, 0 otherwise

-34.268

0.000

-33.780

0.000

0.488

0.969

2 tutorials = 1, 0 otherwise

-31.581

0.000

-46.260

0.000

-14.679

0.212

1 tutorials = 1, 0 otherwise

-16.667

0.159

-19.773

0.002

-3.106

0.792

0 tutorials = 1, 0 otherwise

-48.692

0.000

-40.816

0.000

7.876

0.224

Independent variables without Interactions

Coeff

P-value

Avg mark on other subjects
taken in the same semester

0.628

0.000

1st-year student = 1, 0 otherwise

-6.309

0.001

Full-fee paying student = 1,
0 otherwise

4.026

0.053

Credit points at end of semester

0.735

0.001

Male=1, 0 otherwise

-2.662

0.139

Not B.Commerce =1, 0 otherwise

-0.424

0.883

+

The dependent variable is performance out of 100.
Sample Size = 350 (159 in the control year and 191 the trial year).
R2 = 0.592, Adjusted-R2 = 0.550, F-statistic = 13.91 (P-value = 0.000),
Breusch-Pagan’s chi-square statistic (with 33 degrees of freedom) = 77.678 (P-value = 0.000).
Standard errors have been corrected for heteroscedasticity using White’s consistent estimator (see Greene, 1998, p.291).
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Table V
Performance - Attendance Profiles of a Typical Student+
Mark (100)
Attendance

Control Year

Trial Year

13 tutorials

70

73

12 tutorials

66

65

11 tutorials

70***

58***

10 tutorials

66***

49***

9 tutorials

58

53

8 tutorials

58

44

7 tutorials

48

39

6 tutorials

46

51

5 tutorials

39

40

4 tutorials

29

35

3 tutorials

36

39

2 tutorials

39

26

1 tutorials

54

53

0 tutorials

22

32

+

These profiles have been constructed using the coefficients in Table IV.
A typical student has an mean mark of 57 on other subjects taken in the same
semester, is not in first-year, is not paying full fees, is enrolled in 24 credit points at
the end of the semester, is female and is enrolled in a Bachelor of Commerce
degree.
*** Significantly different from each other at the 0.1 percent level of significance.
** Significantly different from each other at the 1 percent level of significance.
* Significantly different from each other at the 5 percent level of significance.

22

FOOTNOTES

1

Australian university degrees require three years of full-time study.
Students enrolled in a given subject typically attend the same set of lectures,
whereas in many American universities a number of small sections are
scheduled for the same subject. For further description and a comparison of
Australian and U.S. undergraduate study, see Siegfried and Round (1994)
and Lee, Burgess and Kniest (1996).

2

In the year when the incentive scheme was used two casual tutors took
two tutorial groups each. In the previous year two casual tutors took three and
two groups, respectively. Different casual tutors were employed in the two
years but in each year one of the casual tutors had tutored in the subject at
least once before.
3

In the control year, for the convenience of part-time students, each
lecture was repeated at 6.30pm on the same day it was first delivered and one
tutorial per week was held at 7.30pm. There was no repeat lecture or
associated tutorial in the year when the incentive scheme was used.
Unfortunately, the roll book for the 7.30pm tutorial in the control year was
mislaid so no record of attendance for its 19 enrollees is available. The
enrolment count for the control year of 189 and the analysis presented here
excludes these 19 students. I contend that their omission does not bias the
results of the analysis for the following reason. This subject in introductory
statistics is taught in both semesters at my university and in the year when the
incentive scheme was used the repeat lecture was given in the semester
taught by another lecturer. Assuming that part-time, mature students take the
subject in the semester when the repeat lecture is offered then the 19 students
in the 7.30pm tutorial in the control year are likely to behave differently from
the students in the following year’s class. (Indeed, 17 of the 19 students were
part time and only one was in his first year at university.) Thus, their exclusion
is likely to increase the similarity between students in the two classes.
4

In the first two weeks of each semester a considerable amount of
“subject sampling” takes place as students finalize decisions about which
subjects to take. Students can drop subjects and avoid fees until the middle of
the fifth week of the semester; they can drop without having an F recorded on
their academic transcript prior to the end of Week 8.
5

There were three students in the control year and four in the year when
the incentive scheme was used who did not withdraw yet attended no
tutorials. These students are included in all three data sets analyzed here.
6

The null hypothesis is that the relative-frequency distribution of
attendance in the control year is not located to the left of the relative-
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frequency distribution of attendance in the year when the incentive scheme
was used.
7

Table II was constructed using 191 of the 198 “No-WD Students” in the
data set for the year when the incentive scheme was used and 159 of the 166
“No-WD Students” in the data set for the control year. Seven students from
each data set were excluded because they were enrolled in no other subject
and consequently have no observed “average mark on other subjects in the
same semester”. The analysis in Section IV is also based upon these 350
students.
8

The normal load is 24 credit points; 30 credit points constitute a heavy
load. A student taking fewer than 18 credit points is considered to be parttime.
9

In the Australian context at the time of this study most full-fee-paying
students were international students.

10

First-year students were identified from class lists by the first two digits
of their identification numbers, which indicate the first year of enrolment.
11

I thank an anonymous referee for his or her suggestions as to how to
assess the efficacy of the incentive scheme.
12

Separate regressions for the two years found no statistically significant
differences between the coefficients of the control variables so the interactions
between the incentive-scheme dummy and the independent variables were
not included in the model reported in Table IV.
13

This point is made by Romer (1993, p.172) and by Park and Kerr
(1990, pp.105-108).
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